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The role of international bank and its lending to the emerging markets has been long debated. 
To date, the balance of evidence supports the view that foreign bank entry into domestic 
banking system has been largely a positive one. The liberalization of local banking systems and 
the presence of foreign banks have indeed been argued to promote institutional and 
regulatory/supervisory improvements (Mishkin (2009)), and have also resulted in more efficient 
allocation of productive resources in globalized economies (Goldberg (2009)). Likewise, foreign 
banks have been seen as a stabilizing force for host markets. Yet, this proclaimed stabilizing 
role may seem at odds with the view that activities of the global banks have spread profound 
difficulties in international financial markets, including the SEACEN economies, during the 
recent subprime financial crisis period. 
This integrative report is part of a research project conducted at the SEACEN Center to 
evaluate further a number of perspectives on the presence and bearing of the global banks in 
SEACEN economies. In particular, it seeks to address a number of rising policy concerns from 
the aftermath of the recent subprime crisis. Did foreign bank lending decline sharply and 
transmit the financial shocks from the advanced economies to the SEACEN emerging markets? 
Was the decline driven by the drying-up in supply of cross-border loans or more by the sharp 
decline in the demand for this funding? Does greater exposure of foreign banks to a host 
country lowered the sensitivity of its claims to shocks originating from their own economies? Do 
bank claims to a country affected by the aggregate changes in claims to another country? How 
about the stability of these flows? In short, this study aims to ascertain the various aspects of 
international bank lending.  
To address the above set of topical and policy relevant questions, we offer next a more in-depth 
review of the rising role of international bank lending activities in SEACEN economies. The 
discussion unveils some of the domestic factors that have been catalytic in attracting these 
international banks. In this section, we will also compare and contrast lending activities of banks 
from major developed economies, such as Japan, the UK and the US during different periods 
since the early 1990s. More importantly, the recent subprime crisis period will be the focal point 
of the discussion to instill preliminary stylized facts on basic features and trends of these 
international bank lending. A more discerning observation underscores the role of cross-border 
lending vis-à-vis local lending of these international banks. In particular, in some of the SEACEN 
economies, cross-border lending has indeed been the source of volatilities in these flows 
whereas local lending by these international banks remains robust.   
To further substantiate our analyses, Section 3 of the paper first introduces the empirical model 
and panel testing that we will undertake as far as the determinants of international bank claims, 
and elaborates in detail the key findings.  To demonstrate the key features of international bank 
lending in our region, we will focus on the lending activities of banks from Japan, UK and US to 
five SEACEN economies, namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. These 
five SEACEN economies have arguably been subjected to both massive inflows and sudden 
outflows of international bank lending since the mid-1990s.  The Japanese, UK and US banks, 
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on the other hand, have been the major lenders to these economies during the past two 
decades.          
The section of the paper that integrates the findings of the individual research papers coming 
from the research project is presented in Section 4. Essentially, this section summarizes and 
brings to light a number of common and contrasting findings from the experiences of economies 
included in the research project. The diversity of the experiences and stages of financial market 
developments in these economies does not only strengthen the previous discussion as far as 
the findings of the empirical panel testing undertaken in this paper, but, more importantly, it 
enriches the analyses on the set of policy questions posted earlier.  Given what we have 
learned from the experiences of the SEACEN economies in particular, a number of policy 
recommendations to better manage the activities and presence of the global banking system will 
be put forward in Section 5 of the paper. A brief concluding section ends this integrative report. 
 
2. Stylized Facts and Motivation 
Foreign banks’ operations in emerging markets across the global banking system, including 
those of the Asian economies, increased dramatically starting the second half of the 1990s. The 
emerging markets, in general, do not rely on foreign deposits for funding, but they usually turn to 
international banks for credit lines for exports (Mihaljek (2010)). Across eight SEACEN 
economies, the rise of the international banks’ presence started with the first phase of reform 
and deregulation of the banking sector in most of these economies in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. For instance, as reported in Table 1, the total foreign bank claims of four of the eighth 
SEACEN economies, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand in that respective order, 
grew at an annual average of between 16 to 30 percent for the period of 1989-1996. This is not 
to mention that prior to this period, total foreign bank claims to Chinese Taipei grew at an annual 
average of around 19 percent between 1983 and 1988, and slightly tapering off at around 10 
percent by the same period of 1989-1996. It is ironic, however, that with the exception of 
Malaysia which continued to experience strong inflows of international bank flows, Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia and to some extent Chinese Taipei, experienced the most severe declines in 
foreign bank claims across these eight SEACEN economies around the time of the peak of the 
1997 East Asian financial crisis.  
During the time of the reversal of the IT bubble in the US in 2001-2002, the likely retreat of 
foreign banks’ claims to these same eight SEACEN economies were also observed, however, 
this presumed impact is quite uneven. For example, Indonesia and Thailand continued to 
experience a substantial negative contraction in international bank lending during this period. 
Meanwhile, Malaysia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka experienced a slowdown in international 
bank lending after coming-off from around the time of the East Asian financial crisis virtually 
unscathed (Table 1). On the other hand, however, international bank flows to the economies of 
Korea and Chinese Taipei were virtually resilient from the adverse economic episode in the US 
and have also since the East Asian financial crisis experienced a recovery by posting positive 
annual average growth rates in these flows for this same period.         
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The loosening of ownership regulation in most SEACEN economies post Asian financial crisis 
had also significantly facilitated the rise in the activities of international banks in Asia. Indonesia, 
South Korea and Thailand, for instance, have raised the allowance for foreign equity 
participation in local banks of up to 100 percent. Meanwhile, the Philippines permitted 60 
percent foreign ownership. As a consequence, the significantly more liberal ownership policy 
which facilitated an aura of stability and confidence in the respective economies’ banking 
system has frequently been recognized as an important contributing factor to the return of 
sustained surges of foreign bank inflows not only to these four above-mentioned SEACEN 
economies from 2003 to 2007 but also across the board for the wider spectrum of SEACEN 
economies, just before the outbreak of the recent sub-prime crisis in the US (Table 1).  
The total foreign claims of international banks, in general, continued to sustain strong 
momentum into some of the emerging markets of the Asian region even until the first half of 
2008. However, only during the immediate weeks and months following the Lehman Brothers 
debacle, six of the eight SEACEN economies were engulfed in a sharp and sudden reversal of 
international bank claims. The unforeseen and sheer size of these reversals in international 
bank flows out of these six SEACEN economies saw the annual growth rate of these flows 
hitting negative territory by end-of 2008, only with the exceptions of Thailand and Sri Lanka.1 
More recent data reveals that for almost all of the eight SEACEN economies, inflows of 
international bank lending had again returned to these economies (Table 1).2      
As far as the nationality of the sources of these international bank flows, it is interesting that 
during the pre-Asian financial crisis, Japanese banks were the largest sources of funding for the 
banks and corporations in the eight SEACEN economies.3 For example, at its peak for the 
period of 1989 to 1996, Japanese lending amounted to 56 percent and 54 percent of total 
foreign lending to Thailand and Indonesia, respectively (Table 2).4 Not far from these two 
economies are Korea and Malaysia which recorded lending by Japanese banks of 28 and 40 
percent of total foreign lending during the same years, respectively. As presented in Table 2, in 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, a consistent waning in the share of lending by 
Japanese banks were experienced by all of these eight SEACEN economies, and this 
diminishing dominance in lending by Japanese banks have been taken on recently to some 
extent by UK banks and ever consistently by US banks.5 As a result, such is the critical 
influence of Japanese, UK and US owned-banks that the combined lending of these three big 
economies account at least to around half of the combined lending by developed countries into 
each of these eight SEACEN economies (Table 2).    
                                                            
1
  Though Thailand only experienced a very marginal increase in international bank inflows. 
2
 The only exception is Sri Lanka, which presumably suggest that the adverse effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis came to this economy with a lag.  
3
  Exceptions are the Philippines and to some extent, Chinese Taipei, which are both dominated by 
lending from US-owned banks.  
4
 See, for instance, Siregar and Choy (2010) which examines the driving factors behind the total claims of 
seven OECD countries’ banks to nine East and Southeast Asian economies. 
5
   An interesting observation is the heavy dominance in lending by UK-owned international banks to Sri 
Lanka beginning in the mid-1990s and onwards.   
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As discussed above, while international bank lending retreated substantially in almost all of the 
eight SEACEN economies in the immediate aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, it 
can be that a key component of these international bank lending in the form of the local claims 
of these foreign banks operating within the domain of these SEACEN economies remained 
strong and were less adversely affected by the external shock that originated from the US. As 
depicted in Figure 1, while these local claims booked by offices of foreign banks in these 
economies also retreated in Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand such was not the case 
for Malaysia and Chinese Taipei in 2008.6  
In retrospect when we look back at previous crises such as the Asian financial crisis and the 
2001-2002 collapse of the IT bubble in the US, almost all of the eight SEACEN economies 
experienced sharp reversals in total international bank flows during these two separate crisis 
periods similar to the one that recently occurred at end-2008.  However, remarkably, the local 
claims continue to register positive average annual growth rates during the past crisis episodes, 
namely the 1997 East Asian crisis and the 2001-2002 IT bubble.7  In addition, more recent data 
in the post-GFC period indicate that the local claims of the foreign banks immediately recovered 
and grew positively in six of the eight economies, the lone exceptions being the Philippines and 
Chinese Taipei (Figure 1).     
In summary, the cross-country experiences of our six economies highlight the seeming 
indisputable evidence that global banks act as a channel of financial shock transmission from 
the global financial markets to the local economy. Formally testing this hypothesis as well as 
significantly identifying the possible driving factors behind this international bank lending are 
therefore imperative and will be the primary objective of the empirical works of this study.      
 
3. Measurement and Empirical Results 
 
Our baseline general econometric model lays out the possible determinants of international 















   (1) 
where i,j represents economy pairs i and j, and i = 1 to 3 denotes the major BIS-reporting home 
country banks of Japan, UK and the US, while, j = 1 to 5 denotes the  SEACEN host economies  
of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. The dependent variable, ∆logClaimsij,t,  
                                                            
6
 In the case of Sri Lanka, while local claims booked by offices of foreign banks decreased more on 
average than total international bank claims in 2008, the reverse was true in the following period.  
7
  The only lone exception is the case of the Philippines which during the 2001-2002 period also saw the 
local claims by international banks to contract along with total foreign bank claims.  
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is the logarithmic differences of total foreign bank claims8 from banks in home country i to host 
economies j; ∆logClaimsij,t-1 is the lagged of the dependent variable. In Equation 1 we assume 
that νij,t contains the following two effects: (i) the unobserved time-invariant country-pair specific 
effect, ηij,, and (ii) a stochastic error term εij,t, varying across time and cross-section.9   
We follow the voluminous literature on the fundamental determinants of capital flows by 
accounting for in our empirical model the home or push and host or pull factors that figure 
prominently in this extensive literature. On this basis the respective real GDP growth of host 
economy j (growthratej,t) and home country i (growthratei,t).10 We expect a positive coefficient on 
the real GDP growth of host economies as higher returns in these economies should then lead 
to a rise in international bank flows in these economies. Whereas, there is ambiguity as to the 
expected sign of the real GDP growth in home countries as, on one hand, recessionary 
economic conditions in home countries entail lower profit opportunities at home, which should 
then encourage foreign banks to seek better or higher returns abroad in which case we expect a 
negative coefficient on the growthratei,t  variable. On the other hand, weak economic conditions 
in the home countries may signal a worsening of the capital position of foreign banks which 
should then discourage, or worse, retrench their lending overseas. 
Apart from considering the impact of traditional push and pull factors on international bank 
claims, we also take into account a measure of the state of the global financial market, the S&P 
100 Volatility Index (VIXt) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange which is widely used as an 
indicator of expected short-term volatility of the global financial market. A high value of the VIX 
indicates more volatile market expectations and as such we expect a negative coefficient on the 
VIX variable as greater global volatility should lead to a reduction in international bank flows to 
host economies (Hermann and Mihaljek, 2010).11 In line with the well-cited study of van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2003), we also include in our empirical model a measure of the 
potential contagion or spillover of changes in international bank flows from one economy to 
another, and is denoted by the Clenderij,t variable. More popularly known as the common lender 
effect, this argues that movements in international banks’ claims on one economy may be 
transmitted to other economies that owe claims from the same international banks (Peria, et al, 
2005). We follow Peria, et al (2005) in accounting for this effect and thus operationalise 
Clenderij,t as the changes in claims from home country i banks to all the five SEACEN host 
economies other than that of the individual SEACEN host country j.12,13 We should then expect 
                                                            
8
 Total foreign bank claims is the sum of international claims and local claims in local currency; while, 
international claims is comprise of cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in foreign 
currencies. 
9
  In a separate Appendix to this chapter, the technical details of the dynamic panel estimation undertaken 
in this integrative chapter are presented. 
10
  We also include in the estimation the nominal interest differential between host economy j and home 
country i, however, this variable surprisingly came out with the opposite expected sign as it was highly 
correlated with one of the factors and so was entirely omitted from the estimations.  
11
 It is also based on this expected relation that the VIX is also construed as a factor that measures the 
global supply of international bank lending. Higher volatility corresponding to a high value of the VIX 
makes it more difficult for banks to raise additional capital (Takats, 2010).  
12
 As pointed out by Peria, et al (2005), in an ideal sense, the common lender effect can be equated to a 
portfolio allocation choice wherein changes in values of claims trigger an adjustment in other assets or 
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that if the common lender effect works, the coefficient on Clenderij,t would be positive and 
significant.  
Turning finally into our main variable of interest, that is, in order to test the impact of the financial 
crisis on the stability of international bank lending to our respective SEACEN host economies, 
we interact our home economies’ real GDP growth rate variable, growthratei,t, with a measure of 
foreign banks’ exposure to our individual host economies, noting that we measure foreign bank 
exposure as the ratio of home country i’s international bank claims on host economy j to the 
total worldwide claims of home country i’s banks.14 Since crisis coincide with deterioration in 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as in real GDP growth rates as what happened in 
developed markets during the recent global financial crisis, this interaction variable recognizes 
the idea that crisis are basically indistinguishable from downturns in GDP. In this view, this allow 
us to test, depending on the sign and significance of the interaction term, the impact of foreign 
bank exposure on how they react from a shock originating from their own economy. A priori, if 
higher exposure translates into stable international bank lending, we should expect the 
interaction between home country foreign banks’ real GDP growth rate and its exposure to be 
positive.        
 
             
The estimation results of three alternative specifications of the dynamic panel model for the 
whole sample period of 2000Q1 to 2010Q3 are summarized in Table 3. Altogether, with the 
exception of the growth rate in home country variable i, which came out only significant in 
specification (3), all of the estimated coefficients are significant and came out with their 
expected signs. Several key findings are worth to be highlighted. To start, we find evidence that 
international bank flows increase (decrease) their claims on host markets once these same 
economies experience stronger (adverse) macroeconomic growth performance. This result 
confirms the presence of ‘demand factor’ influencing the flows of these claims. All of these five 
SEACEN economies experienced slower growth, particularly during the peak of the recent 
global financial crisis, translating into weaker demand for funding from the international banks. 
Similarly, we find a number of ‘supply side factors’ have also come to play here. First, the 
negative coefficient (as mentioned only though insignificant in specifications (1) and (2)) on the 
home countries’ real GDP growth rate indicates that foreign banks’ behaviour is veered towards 
seeking better or higher returns abroad when domestic economic conditions are weak and 
fragile. The results confirm that weaker economic outlook in home country translates into a rise 
in the foreign bank claims’ on host economy.  
Second, we also find evidence in support of the common lender effect in view of the positive 
and significant coefficient on changes in international bank claims in other economies. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
claims. The limitation of working then with aggregated country level data on international bank claims is 
that it obscures this portfolio allocation decisions at the individual bank level.     
13
  These major East Asian host countries are: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. 
14
 This measure of foreign bank exposure is similar to that of Peria, et al (2005), however, based on some 
unique reason pertaining to the Latin American context, they measure the numerator as home country i’s 
international bank claims on the private sector of host economy j. In this paper, we do not make that 
distinction between private and non-private sectors.      
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seems to support the argument for the presence of contagion effect in international banking. In 
particular it demonstrates that changes in foreign bank claims on one economy might spill over 
to other economies that hold claims from the same banks (van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003)). 
Third, consistent with theoretical expectation, a rise in the expected short-term volatility of the 
global financial market, as proxied by the widely used S&P 100 Volatility Index (VIXt) of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange, has indeed adversely contributed to the overall sharp decline 
in the total claims of the foreign banks. The overall robustness of the supply side factors 
substantiates the role of the international bank claims as a key transmission channel of the 
impacts of a distress banking sector in the advanced economies into the emerging markets of 
SEACEN. 
Finally, the positive and significant coefficient on the main variable of interest, the interaction 
between home country foreign banks’ real GDP growth rate and its exposure suggests that 
controlling for macroeconomic conditions in developed economies, crisis episodes or shocks 
that originate from developed economies do not necessarily translate into less stable financing 
in international bank claims to host economies in SEACEN. This is in contrast, however, with 
the earlier preliminary examination of the flows in international bank claims wherein we 
observed a sharp and sudden reversal during the global financial crisis. Perhaps one reason for 
this seemingly conflicting result is that the foreign bank claims data used in this section is not a 
‘pure’ cross-border claim data. This is in view of the fact that the foreign bank claims data as 
consolidated by the BIS is not just comprised of the cross-border claims but also of the local 
claims of the foreign banks’ offices on residents of the country in which the foreign bank is 
located. Thus, it is highly likely that the local claims component in the data maybe mitigating this 
effect since this particular component of the foreign bank claims hold-up well during the global 
financial crisis.        
 
4.  Lessons from the Research Papers 
The research papers summarized in this section is a study in contrast in terms of their 
economies’ approach or stance to relaxation of capital flows. The SEACEN economies 
examined here range from the relatively ‘stricter’ approach to capital flows, e.g., Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka to relatively more open and liberal stance to capital flows, e.g., Chinese Taipei and 
Korea. As summarized in Table 4, while the research papers employ a variety of data structure 
from macro-panel (Chinese-Taipei15, Indonesia, Korea, Sri Lanka) to time-series (Philippines 
and Myanmar) as well as in the period of observations that either includes both the Asian and 
global financial crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines) or to one that examine beginning the early 
part of 2000s until the recent global financial crisis (Chinese Taipei, Sri Lanka and Myanmar), 
the research papers were almost unanimous in using the growth rate of foreign claims as the 
dependent variable in their various econometric regressions.16 In addition, with the exception of 
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 The Chinese Taipei paper also employs a micro-panel data structure. 
16
 The only exception being the Philippines paper which uses the gross international claims data. In 
addition, as presented in Table 4, the Indonesia paper estimates separate regressions for the growth in 
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the Philippines and Myanmar, most papers have employed bilateral claims that comprise the 
top-four sources of international bank lending in the respective economies, and as we gathered 
from the above discussions, bilateral claims of US, Japanese and UK banks are always 
included.  
In consistency with our own empirics undertaken in the previous section, the research papers 
account in their respective empirical model the home (push) and host (pull) factors of 
international bank flows by including for the most part explanatory variables such as the GDP 
growth rates of the home and host economies as well as the interest rates of the home and host 
economies. Out of the seven regressions reported in total, the home country real GDP growth 
rate came out statistically significant four times. Whereas, the home country interest rate came 
out to be weakly significant, on average, as it only came out to be significant in one of the four 
regressions that this variable was included. Likewise, the host country real GDP growth rate 
came out to be significant in four of the seven regressions undertaken that included this same 
variable, however, the host country interest rate came out to be insignificant in all four 
regressions that included this variable as one of the explanatory variables in the model. These 
results are suggestive of the distinguishing characteristic of the international bank flows into 
some of these SEACEN economies. In particular, the procyclicality of these flows, i.e., better 
(worse) economic conditions in the host (home) economies leads to greater bank flows into 
some of these SEACEN economies, whereas, the role of ‘liquidity’ conditions both in the home 
and host economies does not matter much as a fundamental driver of these flows.17              
In contrast to the strong and robust results obtained with the variable on the expected short-
term volatility of the global financial market in section three of this chapter, only one of the 
research papers (Philippines) actually included this important variable in their estimations, and 
this came out to be highly and negatively significant as expected for this lone paper, which 
again strongly suggest that global supply factors have a role to play in determining bank flows 
from developed to emerging economies.     
Turning now to the impact of crisis episodes on the direction of these bank flows, a dummy 
variable was created for this purpose in all the research papers. Those papers that include the 
period that encompass the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 have unanimously found that this 
crisis episode had a negative effect on this type of flows. Whereas, those papers that tested the 
impact of the recent global financial crisis on these flows have came out with conflicting results. 
While this global financial crisis dummy came out to be significantly negative in the cases of 
Indonesia and Korea, this same crisis dummy variable was insignificant in the regressions 
undertaken in the cases of Chinese Taipei and Myanmar. The more interesting question, 
nonetheless, is whether greater exposure on the part of major foreign banks, as measured in 
this chapter as well as in the other research papers, has a crisis-mitigating impact or, in other 
words, has a stabilizing effect on these bank flows in times of financial turmoil. To answer this 
question, an interaction variable, i.e., product between the appropriate crisis dummy and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
foreign claims and growth of local claims. Similarly, the Philippines paper estimates separate regressions 
for gross international claims and cross-border lending.       
17
 This then corroborates the results of our own set of empirics in section three wherein a measure of 
interest rate differential came out to have weak explanatory power in almost all of the regressions.   
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exposure was created. The balance of the evidence appear to suggest that greater exposure on 
the part of major foreign banks into these selected SEACEN economies fulfill a stabilizing or 
crisis-mitigating role during periods of financial distress. In particular, the interaction term 
between the Asian financial crisis dummy and exposure while insignificant in the case of 
Indonesia, came out to be significant in the regression for the Philippines. More tellingly, the 
interaction term this time between the global financial crisis dummy and exposure came out only 
insignificant in two of the seven regressions undertaken. This latter result, more importantly, 
again corroborates the earlier empirical results undertaken in the previous section.  
Three of these papers have also further considered interesting and related aspects of the 
research issues at hand. For instance, the Chinese Taipei paper also undertook separate micro-
panel regressions on a very large number of observations and found evidence which support 
the above stabilizing argument.18 The Indonesia paper also estimates a separate regression 
using the same set of explanatory variables but using this time the growth of local claims as the 
dependent variable and should be viewed as an alternative angle to robustly ascertain the 
stabilizing-role of international foreign bank lending. It obtained results wherein the interaction 
term between the crisis dummies and exposure came out to be insignificant in both fixed and 
random-effect regressions, which is then interpreted as confirming the result obtained for the 
stabilizing role of international bank flows when total international bank claims was instead 
used.  
The Philippines paper also considered this alternative angle of robustly ascertaining the 
stabilizing-role of international foreign bank lending by estimating separate regressions using 
confidential cross-border lending data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) as the 
dependent variable. This time however, though, while it obtained an intriguing result wherein the 
interaction term between the Asian financial crisis dummy and a measure of exposure came out 
to be positive and significant (again, confirming the stabilizing-role argument), the interaction 
term between the recent global financial crisis and exposure came out to be negative and 
significant, which is, in direct contrast to the above results. Finally, the Philippines paper also 
interestingly examines the question on whether greater trade openness does have a crisis-
mitigating impact on international bank flows. However, the interaction variable between the 
crisis dummies and a suitably measured variable for trade openness came out to be 
insignificant in the regressions.       
                             
5. Policy Challenges Going Forward 
The era of great moderation (low inflation) across the globe has been found to be gravely 
inadequate to safeguard much-needed stability in the financial sector.  Even during the period of 
sound macroeconomic conditions, the financial system was subject to various self-amplifying 
                                                            
18
 Specifically, interaction variables between the GFC dummy and country dummies were included in the 
regression along with a number of balance sheet indicators of domestic and foreign banks in the sample. 
It obtained results wherein these interaction variables came out positive and significant with the exception 
of the UK dummy. This is interpreted as greater exposure of these major foreign banks have a stabilizing 
role on domestic loans as a ratio of deposits (dependent variable) during crisis times.   
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mechanisms in upward trends (bubbles), downward trends (busts) and phases of the credit 
cycle. There has been growing awareness and acceptance of the central bank role as a 
financial stability authority, in addition to monetary authority.  
New responsibility will come with new challenges. In this study, we highlight the role of lending 
activities of international banks, particularly cross-border lending, as a potential source of 
financial instability. Going forward, a number of policy responses to manage potential risks 
associated with international bank lending have actually been tabled and debated. The following 
sub-sections will elaborate some of them.  
 
5.1 Cross-border Supervision 
Cross border banking with the presence of multinational banks (includes the newly emerging 
regional multinational banks) enhances the ‘interconnectedness’ factor. It is now a well known 
fact that globalised banks play a crucial role in the international transmission of monetary 
policies and economic shocks globally. At the first instance, the lack of cross border supervisory 
cooperation has resulted in asymmetric information on cross-border risk exposures leading to 
an under-appreciation by supervisors and regulators of underlying systemic risks and 
connections (Kodres & Narain (2009)). In addition, it is rather obvious that the existence of 
asymmetric information among supervisors in different jurisdictions, leads to untimely and 
uncoordinated responses (Nijathaworn (2010)). Furthermore, adequate cross-country 
supervisory cooperation and coordination are necessary to overcome loopholes such as 
currency substitution, or switching from domestic lending in foreign currency to direct foreign 
credit.  
One potentially effective method to facilitate cross-border policy cooperation and coordination is 
through the college of supervisors.19 The college of supervisors is defined as a “permanent, 
although flexible, structure for cooperation and coordination among the authorities of different 
jurisdictions responsible for and involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-
border banking groups, specifically large group” (The Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS (2009)). As a general rule, the establishment of a supervisory college 
should be considered for significant financial institutions in terms of size, interconnectedness 
with other components of the financial system and/or the roles they play in the market which 
may cause systemic impact on the country’s financial system, hence affecting the region’s 
financial stability. 
A recent survey has identified a number of regional and global banks that have strong presence 
in major Asian economies (Siregar & Lim (2010). The Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), Citibank and the Standard Chartered Bank are among the three major 
                                                            





international banks that have wide and extensive branch networks in the Asian region (Table 5). 
In addition to these three international powerhouses, the South East Asian region has also 
witnessed the emergence of its own multinational banks. In Malaysia, banks such as the 
Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank), Commerce International Merchant Bankers Berhad 
(CIMB) and Rashid Hussain Berhad (RHB) have expanded their networks beyond Southeast 
Asian countries. A number of Singaporean banks, namely the Development Bank of Singapore 
(DBS), the United Overseas Bank (UOB), and the Overseas Chinese Bank Corporation (OCBC) 
have achieved similar success in their efforts to become regional banks. 
As of May 2010, a number of major central banks in Asia have been invited to participate in 
colleges of supervisors. Bank Negara Malaysia, for instance, is involved in the colleges of 
supervisors organized by the Financial Stability Agency of United Kingdom for the Standard 
Chartered Group, the BaFIN for the Deustche Bank Group and the OFSI for the Bank of Nova 
Scotia Group. Similarly, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas have also participated in a number of colleges of supervisors set up for major 
European and the US banks. In addition, under the foreign banking law of a number of 
Southeast and East Asian economies, one of the conditions for the foreign bank to establish its 
subsidiary domestically is that the home-supervisor of that particular foreign bank must sign a 
MOU with the host central banks. This MOU facilitates bilateral exchanges of data and 
information between the two bank supervisors. However, as of late 2010, there has not been 
any arrangement for supervisory colleges for Asian regional multinational banks such as 
Malaysian and Singaporean banks discussed earlier. 
 
5.2 Reducing the complexity of large cross-border banks through ‘subsidiarization’.  
An important cross-border banking issue is the relationship between the home- and host 
supervisory agencies and central banks. In the event that a foreign bank that is systemically 
important in a host country finds itself in a crisis could lead to potential conflicts between the 
home- and host country authorities. These conflicts could be particularly significant if the relative 
size of the parent bank and its overseas affiliate is substantially different, or if the economic 
importance of the overseas affiliate to the parent bank is mainly marginal, e.g., funding of the 
overseas affiliate is mainly sourced from local deposits. For instance, home-country authorities 
will not be keen on supporting a small overseas affiliate, or the overseas affiliate will receive 
less attention from the parent bank or home supervisor as the impact of such failure of the 
overseas affiliate is relatively low or immaterial on the financial group’s overall position, even if 
the troubled overseas affiliate is relatively systemically important for the host country. On the 
other hand, host-country authorities could find it politically difficult to use public or taxpayer 
resources to support a foreign-owned bank when it gets into trouble. 
One of the answers to such challenge of a systemically-important foreign bank failing in a host 
country is to ensure local incorporation as a subsidiary rather than as a branch. All else being 
equal, local incorporation gives host authorities greater supervisory control over local operations 
such as by making it more difficult for assets to be removed from local operation to the parent 
bank, i.e., ring-fenced. Furthermore, it enables the possible imposition of specific capital-related 
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prudential requirements which can provide some separation between the subsidiary and the 
parent bank, and thus reducing intra-group contagion risk (Mihaljek, 2008).  
 
5.3 Other Policy Considerations 
5.3.1 Increasing capital levels and buffers.  
Introduced as part of the new capital standard under Basel III, ‘ample’ or conservation buffers 
reflect the large perceived negative externality associated with a failure of a large cross-border 
bank and as such should be available to enable banks to maintain large enough capital levels to 
offset losses in times of adverse financial shocks. Countercyclical capital buffers, on the other 
hand, rests on the concept that banks should build-up extra capital in times of excessive credit 
growth and as such banks can tap the buffer during periods of financial distress without having 
to raise new capital immediately. Implementing such types of capital buffers can improve the 
banking sector’s resilience to financial crises as well as mitigate its impact on the entire 
economy. 
5.3.2 Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Deposit insurance coverage could be lowered for large cross-border banks. There is a 
perception that large cross-border banks pursue scale, e.g., mergers and acquisitions, in order 
to become ‘too big to fail’. In order to mitigate such incentive a spreading or sharing of the risk in 
the official financial safety-net (a form of co-insurance) can be introduced by reducing the 
deposit insurance coverage for large cross-border banks. This will also reduce the scope for 
free-riding on the part of large cross-border banks as far as the financial safety net mechanism 
of the banking sector. 
5.3.3 Establishment of cross-border collateral arrangements 
This involves the central bank in one jurisdiction providing domestic currency liquidity to 
eligible financial institutions against collateral placed by their offices in another jurisdiction into 
the liquidity-providing central bank’s account at the local central bank. In essence, this is 
another way for central banks to provide a cross-border bridge to support funding requirements 
in another jurisdiction should interbank cross-border intermediation become impaired (CGFS-
2010). 
5.3.4 A systemic risk charge or a systemic risk levy on ‘too-big to fail’ or ‘systemically important’ 
cross-border institutions.  
The bigger the financial institution, the higher is the likelihood that it will be rescued in times of 
financial distress. In other words, the cost of the financial rescue is directly related to the 
systemic relevance or size of the financial institution. One solution is a systemic risk charge that 
mainly depends on the size of the cross-border bank. This follows on from the basic principle of 
the theory of externalities, which suggests that a polluter should be charged with a tax that is 
equivalent to the social costs of the pollution. We can then regard the systemic instability 
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created by the cross-border bank’s activities as an externality and a systemic risk charge could 
be regarded as a way to ‘internalize’ this problem of too-big to fail. 
One such suggested approach is for regulators to assign systemic risk ratings to a financial 
institution and then assess a capital or systemic risk surcharge based on this rating. Banks with 
higher systemic risk rating would receive higher capital or risk surcharges. In short, the 
surcharge is based on the financial institution’s corresponding contribution to systemic risk. In 
principle, under certain assumptions, a surcharge on capital is equivalent to a levy on capital in 
terms of stifling the incentive for large cross-border banks to engage in systemic risk activities. 
However, an important difference between the two is that a levy removes the funds from the 
financial institutions balance sheet, whereas a capital surcharge leaves the funds under the 
control of the financial institutions (Doluca et al, 2010).  
In view of this difference, the advantage of the levy is that it can be used to fund a ‘Systemic 
Stability Fund’ that would act as a private safety net in the event of a financial crisis. The idea is 
that the accumulated levies can then be re-invested into ‘convertible’ or liquid instruments by the 
Systemic Stability Fund into the same financial institutions that had paid these levies. These 
liquid instruments serve to fulfill the financial rescue role that in the event a large cross-border 
banks gets into trouble, these same instruments can be used by the supervisory authorities to 
‘bail-in’ the weakened cross-border bank without resorting to the use of public or taxpayer 
resources. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The recent sub-prime crisis forced a rethink of the mandate of central banks in the area of 
financial stability. Prior to the latest financial crisis, the primary mandate in most central banks in 
Asia was on monetary policy stability, in particular price stability. Recent crisis demonstrates 
that years of monetary stability during the period of great moderation did not safeguard the 
economy from looming financial instabilities. It clearly illustrated as well that the globalized 
banking system played a crucial role in transmitting the crisis from the advanced economies to 
the various corners of the world, including the emerging markets of East and Southeast Asia. 
As policy makers, it is no longer adequate to view domestic banking system in particular and 
financial system in general as being separate from the domestic economy. The increasing 
interconnectedness of domestic banking liquidity to the global funding environment enhances 
the links between domestic financial stability and adverse developments emanating outside of 
the domestic economy. Our study examines the role of international bank claims, in particular 
the cross-border lending, as a critical channel of transmission of worldwide financial shock to 
the local economy. We focus on the recent crisis period to gather greater appreciation of the 
exposure of the local financial system to these external shocks. In addition, we look into a 
number of home-country indicators of economic fundamentals. The exposure and home country 
fundamental variables have been found to be significant factors and confirmed the role of 
international bank lending as a channel of shock transmission from the home countries to host 
economies. Furthermore, the common lender effect -- whereby movements in international 
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banks’ claims on one country may be transmitted to other countries that owe claims from the 
same international banks—underscores the spillover effect that was evident as well during the 
1997-98  Asian financial crisis. 
Going forward, more in-depth researches on the roles, activities and impacts of these global 
banks on the local economy, including local policies, should be carried out. As regional banks, 
such as CIMB, MayBank, OCBC and UOB (as shown in Table 5) continue to expand their 
activities in the region, it will be interesting to ascertain how they perform relative to the 
traditional global banks, such as Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank or HSBC. Are these 
regional banks proven to afford more stability in the region? At the end of the day, the influence 
of the globalized banking system will likely continue to spread and deepen in SEACEN 
economies. Understanding their networks of dealings and anticipating their bearings in these 
economies will undoubtedly improve our capacity to manage them and mitigate, if not, eliminate 
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Indonesia 8.59 16.11 -6.27 -13.33 15.16 -0.85 14.01 
Korea -0.97 20.09 -7.49 6.85 34.50 -19.98 16.76 
Malaysia 0.84 16.12 15.88 1.39 16.69 -5.91 2.75 
Philippines -2.98 6.08 10.30 -2.0 8.44 -20.35 10.89 
Sri Lanka 7.09 3.62 21.87 2.34 22.93 14.24 -4.82 
Chinese 
Taipei 18.94 10.13 1.43 11.05 23.33 -15.60 21.09 
Thailand 8.45 30.65 -13.35 -9.19 9.32 1.61 19.38 






















Average Share of Japanese, UK and US banks in Total Foreign Bank Lending to Selected 
SEACEN Economies 
 











2007 2008 2009 
 
        
Indonesia         
 Japanese 40.48 54.22 30.82 22.57 15.37 14.09 14.66 
 UK 8.40 4.85 8.48 10.08 12.30 13.31 13.20 
 US 19.06 8.96 10.56 9.08 9.32 12.75 13.27 
         
Korea         
 Japanese 31.30 28.48 18.72 13.48 8.86 8.94 9.52 
 UK 7.78 4.80 7.72 10.45 19.44 25.02 24.37 
 US 29.88 18.12 18.93 22.27 23.88 18.91 25.46 
 
        
Malaysia         
 Japanese 43.57 40.91 22.48 11.98 7.73 8.16 8.71 
 UK 8.65 6.40 20.09 26.51 28.12 26.73 27.67 
 US 19.88 24.04 19.19 15.15 14.52 11.51 13.15 
 
        
Phils.         
 Japanese 21.46 19.00 13.45 13.47 10.39 12.97 13.67 
 UK 10.69 8.46 9.78 11.75 12.98 14.60 16.92 
 US 41.13 42.74 27.52 21.99 17.55 17.46 19.58 
  
       
Sri Lanka         
 Japanese 25.79 10.32 4.95 2.37 1.12 0.80 0.63 
 UK 8.13 14.55 22.78 34.60 40.96 41.83 46.33 




       
 Japanese 19.24 20.72 10.61 8.79 7.58 8.72 8.07 
 UK 4.85 7.30 12.08 15.88 19.45 25.89 27.63 
 US 52.24 27.89 31.16 36.52 23.87 21.52 26.38 
  
       
Thailand         
 Japanese 47.33 56.39 38.70 26.62 27.17 31.15 32.39 
 UK 3.18 2.79 6.58 10.95 15.26 16.38 16.50 
 US 23.94 11.44 9.87 10.68 12.70 10.33 12.00 







Dynamic Panel Estimation Results of Determinants of Changes  
in International Total Bank Claims, 2000Q1 – 2010Q3 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
logdiffclaimst-1 -0.045 (0.033) -0.050 (0.033) -0.059 (0.033)* 
growthrateJ 0.245 (0.099)*** 0.383 (0.128)*** 0.303 (0.129)*** 
growthratei -0.169 (0.192) -0.327 (0.214) -0.405 (0.213)** 
vix  -0.42 (0.025)* -0.041 (0.025)* 
Clender   0.176 (0.034)*** 




Sargan test (p-value)   0.07 0.07 0.15 
AB test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.36 0.36 0.61 
         Notes:  standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level;  ** Significant at the   
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 Chinese Taipei Indonesia Korea Myanmar Philippines Sri Lanka 
       
Data Macro and Micro Panel Macro Panel Macro Panel Time series Time series Macro Panel 
       
Period 2000 Q1 – 
             2010 Q2 
1994 – 





1995 Q1 – 
2009 Q4 
2000 –  
2010 Q1 
       
Data on International 

































       
Were Bilateral Claims Used 
Claims from the 
US, UK, Japan 















       
Sign and Statistical 
Significance of Global 
Supply factor, if included 
____ ____ ____ ____ 
negative, 
significant ____ 
       
Sign and Statistical 
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Push Factors: 
      
       
Home country real GDP growth 
negative (significant) – US 
positive (significant) –   
Japan 
insignificant  – UK 








significant insignificant — significant 
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Asian financial crisis dummy — significanta negative, 
significant — 
— — 
       
Global financial crisis dummy insignificant significanta negative, 
significant insignificant 
— — 
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significant — 
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Results from Micro-panel: 
 
Dependent variable - 
(Loans to deposit) 
 
Interaction between 
GFC dummy and  
country dummies - 
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for France, HK, Japan, 
Switzerland and US 
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                   a  Based on results using the growth of foreign claims.    
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Table 5:  
Cross Border Banks in Selected SEACEN Economies 
Countries 
Top 3 domestic FIs in 
your jurisdiction that 
have significant 
presence in the region 
Top 3 foreign FIs in your 
jurisdiction that are 
originated from SEACEN 
member economies 
Top 3 other foreign FIs 
(apart from originating 
from SEACEN member 
economies) that have 
significant presence in 
your country 
 
Indonesia - Bank Mandiri 
- Bank BRI 
- BCA 
- CIMB Niaga 
(Malaysia) 











- DBS (Singapore) 










- CIMB Group 
- Public Bank 
- OCBC 
(Singapore) 
- UOB (Singapore) 


































- Bangkok Bank 
(Thailand) 














- DBS (Singapore) 
- OCBC 
(Singapore) 








- Bangkok Bank 
- Kasikorn Bank 
- Siam Commercial 
Bank 
- UOB (Singapore) 
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   Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
